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3.1  Turns in Monetary Research 
In the past three decades monetary research established  a greater 
understanding  and recognition  of the role  of  money-a  noteworthy 
achievement to which Anna Schwartz has been a major contributor. 
Earlier, in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the role of money had slipped 
far down the list of variables considered important in economic analysis 
and business commentary. Then in the 1960s, opinion began to turn. 
With  Friedman and Schwartz’s A  Monetary History  of  the  United 
States, 1867-1960 (1963) leading the way, an outpouring of studies put 
new life into the traditional  view  of money as paramount. With  the 
turn of opinion and the experience of  the inflationary 1970s, few today 
any longer doubt the primary  importance of money.  Monetary eco- 
nomics continues to thrive on controversy, to be sure, but the difference 
is unmistakable:  Now econometric models of the economy accord a 
central role to monetary variables, and business commentaries, far  from 
ignoring monetary policy, focus on it. And the earlier barren disputes 
between Keynesians and quantity theorists graduated into more fruitful 
discussions about the proper conduct of monetary policy. 
Lately, however, monetary research has turned again, and new stud- 
ies claim that money has little or no effect on output and other real 
variables.  What appeared so natural a marriage between monetarism 
and the theory of a stable competitive economy has produced a rather 
unnatural offspring-instantaneous  price adjustments and rational ex- 
pectations. This new view reaffirms the traditional monetary effects on 
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prices but goes on to claim that changes in money affect only prices 
and perhaps only if the changes are exogenous. Other changes in money 
that may appear to  influence real variables are dismissed as  endogenous 
changes with  no  independent effects  on the economy. In  this  view 
fluctuations in business activity are a real phenomenon with no mon- 
etary roots. 
It is doubtful that anyone, even the practitioners of these models, 
firmly believes that the business cycle can be described as predomi- 
nantly a real phenomenon. The supporting evidence is highly selective 
and limited. A less radical version of the new view admits that market 
prices may adjust sluggishly to monetary changes, so that unanticipated 
changes in money assumed to be exogenous do affect real variables. 
To  what extent are monetary changes unanticipated  as well as exog- 
enous? The question is under debate. If most cyclical fluctuations in 
money are unanticipated and, even when endogenous, still affect prices 
and output, the new and older views would be compatible. But the two 
views  interpret what is unanticipated  differently.  In the older view, 
long-run changes in monetary growth are absorbed by the price level, 
but  all  the short-run and cyclical  changes play  central  roles  in  the 
business cycle; in modern jargon, these cyclical changes would all be 
unanticipated.  The new view assumes, to the contrary, that the only 
unanticipated changes are very short movements, usually just isolated 
blips in the money series, and that all movements beyond one period 
are anticipated and immediately absorbed by prices. (Models with stag- 
gered wage contracts are an exception.) Although the length of a period 
in these models is usually  unspecified, empirical work takes it to be 
one month or quarter. Nothing in the theory requires a period to be 
one month or quarter. But, unless one period covers the length of a 
business cycle, the new view and the older view clearly part company. 
Much of the long-established evidence on the role of money comes 
from broad historical analyses. A broad historical analysis goes beyond 
a narrow dependence on time-series regressions.  It draws on a wide- 
ranging  examination  of  the institutional  environment and  economic 
events in  a series of  historical  episodes. Statistical  tests, including 
regression analysis, of these episodes may be run and prove useful, 
but they would be supplementary. Historical analysis relies on schol- 
arship-a  word  on the way  to losing  its  meaning  in  economics. It 
contrasts with the now common practice of gathering a handful of time 
series from a data bank and running them through a regression meat 
grinder. 
The radical version of the new view in which money is endogenous 
and has no effects on the real economy is based on time-series regres- 
sions, and in particular on vector autoregressions, or VAR for short. 
This view and its evidence have made few converts. The Federal Re- 119  Money-Income Causality 
serve examines business conditions and decides policy, while the mar- 
ket watches anxiously in the firm belief  that open market operations 
do something of utmost importance to the real side of the economy. If 
we accept the bulk of historical evidence as confirming important mon- 
etary effects on the real economy, contrary findings cannot be fully 
valid. And, if such contrary evidence is not valid, what kind of evidence 
in monetary research is acceptable and convincing? I want to address 
this  wider  issue  about  the  validity  of  evidence  from  time-series 
regressions. 
3.2  Endogeneity of the Money Supply 
Central to most criticisms of  evidence on monetary effects is the 
possible endogeneity of money.  The empirical evidence that money, 
prices, and activity are related, now widely accepted, raises the ques- 
tion of the direction of influence. A Monetary History gives it major 
attention. Economic activity as well  as policy  decisions and institu- 
tional  developments obviously  affect  monetary  growth  and fluctua- 
tions.  The fact that money  is  significantly influenced  by  economic 
variables, however, does not itself imply the unimportance of monetary 
effects or justify downgrading their role. Friedman and Schwartz ar- 
gued that the Fed could have prevented the decline in money in 1929- 
33 but failed to act. Stable monetary growth in that period would have 
changed the outcome of  the business contraction. Even if  the actual 
behavior of the money  supply can be viewed as endogenous, it was 
possible for the Fed to have acted to stem the decline in money and 
to have  alleviated  the depression in  output. There is  an important 
difference between being endogenous with no independent effect and 
a mutual dependence in which policy can, when exercised, play a role.' 
Although those who deny monetary effects on output are surely not 
ignorant of this point, they continue to  pay no attention to it. Regression 
methods foster this oversight because of their weak ability to disen- 
tangle a two-way dependence. 
The issue of endogeneity has a long history in monetary controver- 
sies. It appeared in early banking theory as the commercial loan theory 
of credit or real bills doctrine (as named by Mints 1945), which held 
that if banks lent only short term to finance inventories on the way to 
market, the resulting quantity of bank deposits would be just right to 
produce a stable value of money. The attraction of the gold standard 
was that it produced an endogenous money supply that maintained a 
stable value of money in terms of gold. Much of the debate between 
monetarists and Keynesians turns on the endogeneity of money (Foster 
1986). Thus critics of  A  Monetary  History  relied  on endogeneity  to 
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Two initial prominent examples of this counterargument came in 1970 
from Kaldor and Tobin. 
Kaldor focused on the  1929-33  decline in  the U.S. money stock, 
which he attributed to an independent shift towards the use of currency, 
because  of  increased payments for goods  relative  to assets and for 
labor relative to capital costs. This supposedly led to a large increase 
in  the currency-deposit ratio which  reduced  the money  supply. The 
only evidence Kaldor presented to support this explanation of the shift 
to currency was that the currency ratio did not return after the banking 
panic all the way to the low level of  1929. However, the continued high 
level of the currency ratio in the 1940s and 1950s can be attributed to 
other developments which  I  investigated  in  my  work on the money 
supply (Cagan 1958, 1965). Kaldor might have argued with more force 
that  the  1929-33  decline  in the money  stock did  indeed  reflect the 
banking panic, which in turn was produced by the contraction in busi- 
ness activity. If such an argument were valid, he could reach his con- 
clusion that the money-income association simply showed the effect 
of  income  on  money. A critical  step in  this  endogeneity  argument, 
however, requires evidence that the banking panic can be explained 
by the business contraction rather than other largely independent de- 
velopments.  Kaldor disregards all the studies of the genesis and role 
of  banking panics in  U.S. history. Business contractions do not fully 
explain panics. It follows that income did not cause money in these 
episodes, and the association reflects the reverse channel of influence. 
There are two additional objections to Kaldor’s type of endogeneity 
argument. First is the point made above: The fact that money may be 
endogenous does not prove or even imply that it has no reverse effect 
on activity. The money-income association reflects a changeable, two- 
way  dependence. The importance of  a two-way dependence is that 
money need  not  always be  entirely  endogenous.  Policy actions can 
break the prevailing endogeneity, whereupon the existence of monetary 
effects means that they can be altered by policy to influence economic 
activity. Even if money were in some sense completely endogenous in 
1929-33,  therefore, the Fed’s failure to stem the decline in money had 
devastating consequences for the economy. 
The second point is that a two-way dependence cannot be confirmed 
by  one observation. All we can confirm is a comovement, with indi- 
cations of channels of  influence possibly in both directions. Whether 
one or the other direction of influence dominates is never clear-cut in 
a single case. Friedman and Schwartz were well aware of  this ambi- 
guity, and devoted A Monetary History to analysis of a century of many 
different episodes. I also addressed the ambiguity in my book on the 
money supply (Cagan 1965). The comovements in money and business 
activity have persisted through a variety of  cyclical episodes. In par- 121  Money-Income Causality 
ticular, the comovements appear as well in a group of severe cycles, 
some with and some without banking panics. The 1929-33  episode had 
a banking panic, which  might appear to imply a one-way channel of 
influence running from a severe business contraction to panic to mon- 
etary decline. The evidence against that interpretation comes from the 
variety of monetary episodes. In 1914, for example, we had a banking 
panic but, thanks to a  1908  law authorizing the emergency issue of 
national bank notes, no large decline in the money stock and no severe 
contraction in activity ensued. Thus a single channel of influence of 
activity  on money  does not explain all the cyclical  comovements in 
money and business. While the explanations for fluctuations in money 
vary, a persistent  association between money and business remains: 
when money declines sharply, business activity also declines sharply, 
and not otherwise. How Kaldor and other critics could fail to grapple 
with this kind of evidence I can only ascribe to impatience to make an 
argument without examining the full range of historical evidence and 
without searching for interpretations that fit all of 
Tobin presented a theoretical model to demonstrate that the observed 
lead of monetary growth ahead of fluctuations in income does not prove 
causality. The model assumes that money is supplied endogenously at 
all times in response to changes in the demand for money.3 Although 
money has no effect on income in the model, cycles in money turn out 
to lead those in income. This lead reverses the implication of standard 
models of money demand in which  income affects the demand con- 
temporaneously or  with a lag and so moves ahead of cycles in a passive 
money supply. The reversed timing in Tobin’s model occurs because 
of the peculiar nature of his money demand, as  Friedman (1970) pointed 
out in his reply. Tobin’s money demand, which follows convention in 
depending on transactions proxied by income and on financial wealth, 
unconventionally  declines  in business expansions because the usual 
increases in transactions demand are dominated by declines in wealth 
demand. Thus the wealth demand for money behaves countercyclically. 
How can that be? Tobin assumes, first, that in business expansions the 
increase in income raises tax revenues and reduces the government 
budget deficit and, second, that the issue of government bonds to fi- 
nance the deficit falls off faster than corporate bonds are increased to 
finance more investment. During an expansion, therefore, the decline 
in  the wealth  demand for money  produces a decline in  the passive 
money supply ahead of income and gives the misleading appearance 
of causing a subsequent downturn in income-and  conversely for cy- 
clical contractions. 
The timing in this model rests on fragile assumptions, however.  If 
the government budget deficit is small, as  it was for most of our history, 
a demand for money dependent on total financial wealth  would  not 122  Phillip Cagan 
produce a lead over income, even for the special case here in which 
the supply is entirely passive to the demand. 
Tobin goes on to point out, as  had Walters (1967) earlier, that if money 
demand depends only on permanent income, exogenous changes in the 
money supply will produce large immediate changes in current income, 
because such changes are required to change permanent income suf- 
ficiently to bring money demand into equilibrium with the new supply. 
Such a relationship produces leads in money ahead of income that are 
short relative to the leads in Tobin’s preceding model in which money 
does not affect income. Hence the preceding no-effect model is more 
consistent with the evidence of a long lead than is the permanent income 
model, contradicting a causal implication of leads. But this hardly proves 
that money cannot affect income. It need only imply that, given the 
observed long lead of money over income, the demand for money is 
not determined exclusively by permanent income. The demand is very 
likely subject to other influences and to adjustment lags that attenuate 
the large  immediate effect on current income. A quarter century of 
research on the demand for money equation confirms the role of other 
influences and of lags in addition to the role of permanent income. 
Although Tobin’s model does not illuminate the actual relation be- 
tween money and income, his argument succeeded in fostering skep- 
ticism of timing leads in economic variables as evidence of a direction 
of influence. Skepticism certainly has its place in empirical work, but 
timing leads deserve a word in their defense. Granted that leads are 
not by themselves  conclusive evidence of directions of influence, as 
Kaldor and Tobin maintain, dismissing leads as irrelevant goes too far 
when our knowledge of the economic system points to the relationship 
suggested by an observed lead. The everyday world of business fore- 
casting shows little skepticism of leads and for good reason. If a lead 
is moderately long, it is most likely not affected by feedback and there- 
fore is suggestive of a causal relation. Most economic as  well as  physical 
effects travel forward in time. 
There are some dangers of misinterpreting the appearance of a lead, 
to be sure. Rates of change shift the appearance of a timing sequence, 
as illustrated by a sine curve in which its rate of change both leads and 
lags its level. Nevertheless, misleading relationships involving rates of 
change can be uncovered by careful examination of the data. Another 
problem much discussed in recent literature involves expectations. The 
public  may  anticipate future changes in  a variable  and affect  other 
variables ahead of the anticipated change. Thus  asset prices may change 
before the economic events responsible for the change occur. But even 
in financial markets, which  are most affected by  expectations, such 
leads are surely not very long, given the sorry state of forecasting. The 
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leading does not appear applicable to the nonfinancial sectors of the 
economy. A skepticism of leads based on rational expectations should 
not be carried too far. 
3.3  Time-Series Regressions and Endogeneity 
When empirical research became subservient to time-series regres- 
sions, largely since World War 11, endogeneity of the variables on the 
right side of regressions was not thought to be a problem. Either causal 
sequencing was assumed by lagging the right-hand variables, or the use 
of annual data supposedly diminished any short-term feedback from 
the dependent variable. Time-series regressions came to be accepted 
as evidence of  real-world relationships.  (I take up the questionable 
validity of this acceptance below.) 
The early study by Friedman and Meiselman (1963) called attention 
to the empirical importance of monetary effects on income by showing 
that money outperformed the driving variable of the Keynesian theory, 
autonomous investment. In extensions of their approach, the St. Louis 
equation confirmed the importance of money and the unimportance of 
fiscal variables (Andersen and Jordan  1968, Carlson 1986). Although 
fiscal variables  sometimes rose above the floor of statistical insignif- 
icance, they never attained the importance they were supposed to have 
in the prevailing Keynesian theory. After a string of forecasting suc- 
cesses in the late  1960s, however, the St. Louis equation faltered in 
the 1970s and fell from favor. The inflationary 1970s nevertheless dra- 
matically certified the importance of money for inflation and by  im- 
plication also for output fluctuations. 
The rational expectations developments in theory that rose to prom- 
inence in the late 1970s introduced new views of monetary effects. The 
new versions of the money-income regressions separated money into 
its anticipated and unanticipated  components.  Since the anticipated 
component is predictable, it must be endogenous to the economic sys- 
tem.  This emphasis on anticipations presumes that  the predictable, 
endogenous component of monetary growth is sizable and important. 
Initial studies found that only unanticipated changes in money affect 
output, because prices fully absorb the anticipated changes. But then 
more sophisticated statistical tests reported that both components of 
monetary changes affect output. Apparently, empirical differences be- 
tween the effects of  anticipated and unanticipated monetary growth 
cannot be reliably e~tablished.~ 
These studies raise a question about the meaning and measurement 
of anticipated monetary growth. Clearly, after prices fully adjust to an 
increase in monetary growth, the temporary stimulation to output that 
occurred during the adjustment disappears. The only question concerns 124  Phillip Cagan 
how rapidly the economy adjusts. If the measure of anticipated mon- 
etary growth implies a faster adjustment than in fact occurs, the analysis 
will  show an effect of the anticipated growth on output. But there will 
be some measure of  anticipated monetary growth consistent with the 
actual pace of price adjustment so that only the residual unanticipated 
growth correlates with  output. Controversy  arises here because the 
new view of expectations implies much faster adjustments than most 
studies can  verify. No doubt  anticipated money  has  little effect  on 
output in data measuring cycle averages, but the more recent studies 
show that it has such effects in quarterly and even annual data. The 
existence of  monetary effects is not at issue here. The only issue, to 
describe it  in the new terminology, concerns  how  rapidly economic 
behavior becomes  “rational.”  Since behavior is “rational”  for cycle 
averages, the  issue is  whether  it  should be  labeled  “irrational”  for 
shorter time spans, thereby suggesting some kind of failure of market 
adjustments. I might note that, if the stochastic component of economic 
variables can  be characterized by  permanent and transitory  random 
shocks, rational economic behavior will respond to the expected values 
of the permanent component by filtering out the transitory component 
via an “adaptive expectations” adjustment which can take some time 
(Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer 1980). 
Although motivated to examine the difference between anticipated 
and unanticipated  monetary growth, these studies can also be inter- 
preted  as introducing  a procedure-formalized  later  in  “causality” 
tests-to  remove endogenous changes in monetary growth that reflect 
predictable influences on the money supply. The residual changes in 
money, assumed to be “unanticipated,” thus show an effect on output 
free of spurious correlation. Since the anticipated component of mon- 
etary growth is by derivation endogenous, the finding of later studies 
(see note 4) that it has equal effects on output can be faulted for de- 
pending on a variable that lacks exogeneity. Indeed, if  an important 
component of money is anticipated, its endogeneity calls into question 
all regression studies that claim to find monetary effects.5 
The old argument that correlation does not imply causation, which 
received little attention while econometric research focused on devel- 
oping more sophisticated techniques, has now become a major issue. 
Consider the standard St. Louis equation, which regresses changes in 
nominal GNP on concurrent and past changes in money and govern- 
ment expenditures.  These variables  are assumed to represent  unidi- 
rectional effects on GNP. That assumption can be questioned by  the 
likely feedback from GNP to the concurrent change in money. In an 
attempt to avoid this feedback, the concurrent monetary variable can 
be omitted from the regression, with the purpose of isolating the effect 
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the major impact. Unfortunately, this does not necessarily  eliminate 
the possibility of any feedback. 
Feedback produced by expectations is one kind frequently discussed 
that may reach beyond concurrent movements. Thus policy may pro- 
duce monetary changes in anticipation of future changes in GNP. Such 
feedback could, in principle, account for an observed correlation be- 
tween GNP and earlier monetary changes. Nevertheless, this possi- 
bility seems far-fetched. Policy is generally not based on forecasts more 
than a quarter or two ahead. Even if  this could be done accurately, 
the resulting relationship would not ordinarily produce a positive cor- 
relation with GNP, since policy is as often used to try to offset antic- 
ipated movements in aggregate demand as to reinforce them. To explain 
a positive feedback we must assume a channel working through the 
currency and reserve  ratios, but  it is hard  to see why expectations 
should move these ratios ahead of developments in the economy. Feed- 
back  through expectations beyond  the concurrent period, therefore, 
can surely be largely ignored, and in  practice they usually are. 
However, a potentially serious form of feedback can result from nor- 
mal serial correlation in the money and GNP series. Suppose GNP af- 
fects money concurrently. The serial correlation in GNP will then transmit 
its concurrent feedback to monetary changes earlier and later in time. 
The resulting correlation with earlier monetary changes will give the ap- 
pearance of their causal influence on GNP even if no such influence ac- 
tually exists. To  take a simple extreme example,  suppose economic 
activity generated a concurrent cyclical fluctuation in the currency ratio 
and thence in the money supply. There is indeed evidence of such an 
effect (Cagan 1965). Cyclical fluctuations implant serial correlation in 
economic data. The fluctuations in economic activity will correlate with 
past changes in money, contaminating the evidence of the St. Louis 
equation. The correlation will, of course, also appear between activity 
and future changes in money, giving the impression that money is en- 
dogenous to past changes in activity as well. 
The possible  presence  of  this  form  of  feedback  still  leaves open 
whether it can account for the association between money and income. 
When  Friedman and Schwartz and  I  discussed this question of  the 
direction of influence, we concluded that the money-income association 
could be explained only in part by  the effect of  activity on money, 
because the sources and nature of this effect varied considerably over 
time and could not account for the consistency of the observed asso- 
ciation. The historical evidence indicated that only a strong monetary 
effect could account for such a consistent association over a long his- 
tory of cycles. 
Such historical analysis of the evidence has not satisfied a preference 
for formal statistical testing, however, and regressions  have become 126  Phillip Cagan 
the accepted form of  empirical analysis. The new  “causality”  tests 
emphasize the point that the existence of serial correlation and feedback 
compromise  evidence  based  solely  on  conventional  time-series 
regressions. 
3.4  Testing for Causality 
I  see the  motivation  for the  revolution  in  method  introduced by 
Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) as residing in the feedback problem. 
To  ascertain the effect of a variable that is partially endogenous, their 
causality tests remove the serial correlation in a pair of variables and 
then look for any remaining correlation between them. This “whiten- 
ing” of the data eliminates the appearance of feedback that is carried 
by  serial correlation backwards and forwards in  the data. The basic 
idea is that only a cross correlation that survives the extraction of serial 
correlation in the individual series provides evidence of a direction of 
influence that can be identified by  statistical means. 
Much has been written in criticism of these tests because of the initial 
claim that they  identified causal  influences. Philosophical critics ob- 
jected to the derivation of something so basic as a “cause”  from un- 
structured statistical relationships (Zellner 1979). So at best the tests 
can claim only to look for exogeneity and temporal sequences. Econ- 
ometric critics pointed to the problem of  expectations and technical 
difficulties of  prewhitening (Feige and Pearce  1979). As general prop- 
ositions, the criticisms carry weight, but in application to the money- 
income relationship, we have specific knowledge to make judgments 
about expectations. Expectations are simply too weak and inaccurate 
to account for strong correlations over more than a short time horizon. 
As for the philosophical question of  causality,  economists do tradi- 
tionally  reach  tentative  conclusions from  statistical time  sequences 
about directions of influence when our theory gives a sound basis for 
expecting such influences. 
The difficulties of prewhitening are another matter.  Similar to the 
studies of unanticipated money, the tests of causality at first found an 
effect of money on output as well as prices. However, many subsequent 
studies reported  mixed  or negative  results, particularly  for foreign 
countries, apparently owing to differences in the method of removing 
serial correlation from the variables.6 Although these studies are not 
all equal in technical sophistication and quality of scholarship, it is still 
not a simple matter for readers to determine the degree of  validity of 
a  particular  study, much  less  a group of  studies covering  different 
countries and periods. Despite the number of clear indications of mon- 
etary effects the totality of this literature leaves the evidence subject 
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Since a variety of prefilters can be used to attain the objective of 
whitening regression residuals, we are left with the uncomfortable 
conclusion that an essentially arbitrary choice left to the discretion 
of  individual researchers  can significantly affect the nature of the 
economic conclusions derived from the test procedures. 
3.5  The VAR Statistical Method 
These causality tests disregard the possible influence of other vari- 
ables on the two under examination-a  major deficiency. This led Sims 
(1980b) to expand the number of variables included by means of a VAR 
method. To  examine monetary effects, the VAR  groups money with a 
set of other relevant variables, usually output, prices, interest rates, 
and sometimes bank credit, and regresses each one on lagged values 
of  themselves  and  each  other.  The  estimated  coefficients  of  these 
regressions  show the effects of  the lagged values of the variables on 
each other, after the correlation between the lagged values of  all the 
right-hand variables has been removed. In practice this method avoids 
the need for prewhitening the data because it effectively removes the 
serial correlation in  each variable as well as the cross correlation of 
the right-hand variables with concurrent and past values of each other. 
What remains are statistically exogenous movements in the right-hand 
variables, attributable to events from outside the system of variables 
being examined. Only if  these exogenous movements in money then 
correlate with subsequent movements in output, in which correlations 
of output with past values of itself and the variables other than money 
have also been removed, does uncontaminated evidence of a monetary 
effect exist. 
In view of  the problem of disentangling multiple influences, VAR  is 
a legitimate and welcome attempt to deal with spurious correlation. It 
can help to confirm effects that are obscured by relationships among 
endogenous variables. Let us leave aside the various econometric ob- 
jections (Learner 1985, Cooley and LeRoy 1985). I want to raise ob- 
jections of a practical nature that have received less attention. I have 
no quarrel with the purpose and the method, but rather take exception 
to the interpretation of  the results. The VAR  seems to me to be hope- 
lessly unreliable and low in power to detect monetary effects of  the 
kind we are looking for and believe, from other kinds of evidence, to 
exist. 
A VAR  test can answer two questions. First, how much effect does 
an exogenous disturbance in one of  the variables of the system have 
on output? An  unfortunate  ambiguity arises here if  concurrent dis- 
turbances in the different variables are correlated. In the absence of a 
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disturbances must be imposed arbitrarily. If  we are willing to treat all 
of the concurrent disturbances in money as exogenous, the VAR  can 
answer an important second question about the effect of  monetary 
changes. This is given by the statistical significance of the lagged mon- 
etary variables in a regression of output on the lagged values of money 
and the other variables of the system. 
In the widely noted article by Sims (1980b), money affected output 
in the VAR  system but, in the post-World  War I1 period, not after an 
interest rate was included. The interest rate in that period accounted 
for most of the effect on output previously  attributed to money.  In 
other studies a  credit variable  equals and  sometimes surpasses the 
effect on output and prices of money. The findings of these studies are 
not all in mutual agreement, but the overall implication is that money 
responds endogenously to other economic variables  and that its ob- 
served simple correlation  with  output and perhaps also prices  may 
reflect a spurious correlation produced by other economic influences.’ 
3.6  Interpretation of an Interest-Rate Effect 
Sims (1980b) explained the result that an interest rate knocks out the 
significant effect of money by extending the theory that business reces- 
sions reflect exogenous declines in the marginal product of investment: 
Businesses anticipate this decline in investment opportunities, which 
leads to a reduction in investment expenditures and eventually in out- 
put. In the meantime,  before the anticipated decline in the marginal 
product of  investment actually occurs, the decline in investment re- 
duces the prices of new capital goods and increases the yield on existing 
capital as measured by the ratio of its still intact returns to its lower 
market prices. Interest rates follow this rise in capital yields. Such a 
rise in interest rates would, as Sims suggests, correlate negatively with 
the subsequent decline in output. But one wonders how much a three- 
month interest rate would be affected by the yield on existing capital 
goods. Would not the assumed decline in borrowing more likely succeed 
in lowering short-term interest rates? 
The sequence of effects outlined by Sims puts an unbelievable weight 
on the ability of investors to foresee future changes in the marginal 
product of investment. To  avoid this, alternative theories are available 
to account for an association between interest rates and future output. 
A rise in interest rates is widely thought to work to depress output. If 
money is not to play an active role, however, we must assume that the 
money supply adjusts passively to induced changes in its demand. In 
Sims’s VAR  results, money declines as interest  rates rise, which he 
attributes to a passive response of supply to a decline in the demand 
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output. This reasoning attributes movements along the supply curve 
improperly  to movements along the demand curve. The subsequent 
fall in  output could  reduce monetary growth, but the earlier rise in 
interest rates would ordinarily increase monetary growth as banks ex- 
pand to take advantage of higher rates and as the Fed partially accom- 
modates the expansion. In any event, what then becomes of the decline 
in monetary growth that Friedman and Schwartz  found to lead business 
downturns? Apparently  the VAR  relates the monetary decline to the 
concurrent rise in interest rates. To attribute that relation to a passive 
response of the money supply to a decline in its demand seems to me 
shaky. The widely accepted explanation of a negative relation between 
interest rates and money goes the other way, such that the monetary 
change induces the change in interest rates. 
Sims does consider a possible monetary interpretation of his results, 
whereby interest rates reflect but precede exogenous changes in money. 
He  conjectures that this might happen if policy changes in the monetary 
base have delayed effects on the money stock but affect interest rates 
immediately.  Yet  he rejects  this alternative hypothesis, because the 
interest rate continues to dominate in his VARs even after the monetary 
base is substituted for the money supply. 
Sims overlooked the alternative explanation  subsequently pointed 
out by McCallum (1983). If the Fed targets interest rates, money be- 
comes endogenous to the interest-rate target. Nevertheless, it is mon- 
etary policy, setting interest rates in response to market developments, 
that determines the outcome. 
The historical importance of interest-rate targeting certainly raises 
doubts about a business cycle theory based on exogenous shocks to 
interest rates. But McCallum’s point, while important, may not provide 
a full  explanation.  Interest-rate targets  have not  always determined 
monetary policy, particularly beyond very short-run horizons, so that 
many  longer-run fluctuations in  money  have other explanations. No 
doubt many of these monetary fluctuations are also related  through 
policy  decisions  and  banking  responses  to  market  developments. 
Nevertheless, to attribute all or most monetary fluctuations to interest 
rates conflicts with other evidence. In the straightforward NBER anal- 
ysis of cyclical turning points, monetary growth displays long and vari- 
able leads, while short-term interest rates have little or no leads on a 
positive basis over business cycle peaks (Cagan 1966). This apparent 
inconsistency with the VAR results calls for further study.8 
3.7  The VAR in Practice 
With the VAR results we have arrived at the anomalous situation in 
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does not  affect activity, and perhaps not  prices  either, even though 
such effects are confidently expected in financial markets, by the mon- 
etary authorities themselves, and indeed by most economists. What is 
going on here? This is not a case of research ignoring some of the messy 
but unimportant details of reality. These results conflict with the major 
effects  of  money  as widely  perceived. A  conflict  between research 
results and widely perceived reality has never stopped economists, to 
be sure, but it should give pause for second thoughts. 
The VAR  literature  is growing apace, and perhaps some plausible 
and generally accepted interpretation of these anomalous results will 
soon emerge. Much leeway exists for tinkering with the form of the 
equations. Economic research often gives birth to conflicting results 
which  subject a line of research  to controversy. But usually  contro- 
versies can be understood in terms of differing hypotheses about eco- 
nomic behavior. For example, when money stood near the bottom of 
the totem pole of relative importance, nonmonetary explanations  of 
the business cycle invoked theories of an investment accelerator, or 
the “animal  spirits”  of businessmen, or shocks to the consumption 
function-all  capable of empirical interpretation and examination. In 
most of the VAR results, by contrast, one struggles in vain to decipher 
what they imply about economic behavior, inasmuch as the VAR method 
cooks the data beyond recognition. 
To illustrate the VAR method I regressed real GNP on lagged values 
of itself, the GNP deflator, the commercial paper rate, and money, from 
first-quarter  195  1 to second-quarter 1987. The variables are log levels, 
and each right-hand  series is represented by eight lag terms. This is 
one equation of a typical four-variable VAR system to test for monetary 
effects.  With  the commercial  paper rate excluded to form  a  three- 
variable system, the money terms are collectively highly  significant, 
but with the commercial paper rate included the money terms have a 
much lower, though still significant, level of .035.  No detrending was 
applied. Sims (1980b) found money to be insignificant in the latter four- 
variable system with monthly data using industrial production for real 
GNP and twelve lag terms. Stock and Watson (1987) resurrected the 
significance of money for the same monthly system, but for a shorter 
period beginning with  1960 and after detrending the data. The major 
differences in results depending on the data series used and on the time 
period covered illustrates a certain lack of robustness of VAR. 
Figure 3.1 shows the residual terms of my quarterly real GNP regres- 
sion with the money terms first included and then excluded. As shown 
by the amplitude of the residuals, the predicted values of both regres- 
sions lie mostly  within  1 percent of the level of real  GNP. The two 
residual series differ by only a small fraction of the amplitude of busi- 
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economic as opposed to statistical significance of including money here 
hardly pays its way. 
What  does the  contribution of  the  money  terms, buried  in  these 
computations, look like? Figure 3.2 gives their picture. It is based on 
the principle that the partial  correlation of  a dependent on an inde- 
pendent variable in a multiple regression is equivalent to the simple 
correlation between the residuals of the two variables from regressions 
on the other independent variables. Thus, in this case, the eight lagged 
monetary  variables  are regressed  in  turn  on the other independent 
variables  (including the other  seven monetary  variables,  which ex- 
cludes the one as dependent variable), and the residuals of these regres- 
sions are cumulated in a sum for each date which is weighted by the 
regression coefficients of the monetary terms in the full four-variable 
regression. The correlation of this series in figure 3.2  with the residuals 
of the regression excluding the money series (the dotted series in figure 
3.1) is equivalent to a test of  the combined  significance of the eight 
money terms.9 
Figure 3.2 shows the contribution of the monetary terms to real GNP 
in  the VAR  regression, as just  described, and figure 3.3 shows the 
quarterly rates of actual monetary growth and the tendency of  their 
fluctuations to lead business turns. The VAR by comparison attenuates 132  Phillip Cagan 
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and largely eliminates the cyclical fluctuations in monetary growth (and 
in real GNP as well) before testing for their correlation. Note the rel- 
atively small amplitude of fluctuation of the monetary contribution in 
figure 3.2. (The comparison of amplitudes between figures 3.2 and 3.3 
is admittedly made difficult by the difference in units. Figure 3.2 shows 
quarterly deviations on the order of  one-third of  a percent, largely 
offsetting over each of several quarters. Figure 3.3 shows annual rates 
of  change, with  cyclical fluctuations on the order of roughly 4 per- 
centage points, that is, 4 percent in a year.) Thus VAR  looks to the 
noncyclical, very short-run movements in economic variables to iden- 
tify their cross effects. This critically limits the evidence and poses 
serious problems for identifying monetary effects. 
3.8  Deficiencies of  the VAR Method 
VAR originated as a welcome response to the largely neglected prob- 
lem  of  spurious correlation  among economic variables.  But  are its 
results trustworthy? Its application to money points up three problems 
that the generally voiced econometric criticisms gloss over. These are 
the linearity of regressions, the complex interaction between  money 
and interest rates, and the elimination of most of  the cyclical fluctua- 
tions in money. The first two are not problems confined to VARs, as 
will be noted. 
Linearity governs all regression analyses and may often be a rea- 
sonable approximation to a moderately nonlinear reality. But for mon- 
etary  effects  it  is  not  reasonable  and  cannot  be  made  so  by 
transformations to logarithms or to first differences. The limitations of 
linearity apply to St. Louis-type  equations as well as VARs. Monetary 
episodes vary substantially in timing and cannot all be represented by 
the same values of parameters and fixed lag patterns. This seems clear 
from historical analysis.  lo Perhaps the variability in the timing of mon- 
etary effects can be represented by a complex dynamic system, but 
certainly not by  a three- or four-variable VAR  or by any system of 
equations  we  are now  capable of  specifying. Moreover, the timing 
varies from  stage to  stage of  business cycles, so regressions  fit  to 
subperiods covering a few cycles do not avoid the problem.  Thus a 
fixed lag pattern estimates a varying lag pattern as an average, which 
reduces the estimated correlation between money and the variables it 
affects. The extent of the reduction could be substantial, possibly to 
the  point  of  not  showing a  significant effect.  Money  illustrates the 
theoretical point that a linear independence does not rule out a non- 
linear dependence of some kind. (See Snowder 1984.) 
Consider the variation in the lag of monetary effects in recent cyclical 
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half  year before business  activity did. The monetary peak preceded 
the business peak at the end of  1973 by about a year and preceded the 
sharp decline in  output in October 1974 by almost two years (though 
the peak in output came earlier and was followed by a plateau). By 
comparison, the lag in monetary effect was just a few months at the 
early 1980 business peak precipitated by the imposition of credit con- 
trols, and again just a few months at the mid-1981 business peak which 
appeared short because the escalation of inflation had earlier reduced 
monetary growth in real terms. One average lag pattern does not cap- 
ture the variety of  these episodes. The variations in monetary rela- 
tionships  reflect  their  complexity  and  not  changes  in  “monetary 
regimes,” as that term has recently been used. 
As a second problem with VARs  that include an interest rate, the 
varying interaction between money and interest rates can hide mone- 
tary  effects.  Interest rates  can at times  influence monetary growth 
positively because of a response by bank lending and monetary policy, 
and at other times a tight or easy monetary policy affects interest rates 
negatively. These interactions make both money and interest rates partly 
endogenous. In addition, the cyclical pattern of interest rates conforms 
to business activity, so that the rise of rates in expansions correlates 
negatively with the subsequent decline in activity. If the movements 
in  interest rates that are exogenous to monetary growth have a more 
systematic cyclical pattern than do the movements in monetary growth 
that are exogenous to interest rates, the VAR  will show a closer cor- 
relation between interest rates and business activity than between money 
and activity. Yet  this finding would give the wrong impression of the 
monetary process at work. And there would be no way to determine 
the true relationship by linear regression methods. 
As a specific example take the 1969 episode. The Fed reduced mon- 
etary growth drastically beginning in  Apri1.I’ In due course a credit 
crunch developed in September producing sharp increases in  interest 
rates, and business turned down in December. Given a fairly consistent 
relation  between  interest  rates and business activity and the timing 
variability of monetary effects, the VAR  analysis will find support for 
the role of interest rates in the 1969 episode and downplay the decline 
in  monetary growth.  But  that  misrepresents  the  paramount  role  of 
monetary policy in this episode. 
A third problem with VARs is that the particular technique for dealing 
with spurious correlation eliminates important monetary changes. By 
removing all serial and cross correlations from economic series, VAR 
reduces them to exogenous movements and looks for correlation be- 
tween these movements in  each pair of series. But these exogenous 
movements are little more than isolated blips in the series, which in 
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out the effect of monetary blips. Only changes in monetary growth that 
are maintained for an extended period of time affect business activity. 
These extended changes in monetary growth, however, exhibit serial 
correlation and, despite their variable lags in affecting output and prices, 
tend to be correlated with cyclical movements in other economic vari- 
ables. The VAR  accordingly eliminates the correlated movements in 
money as endogenous to the economic system. Thus does this tech- 
nique give new meaning to the old cliche of “throwing the baby out 
with the bath water.”  Only the monetary changes that have little effect 
on GNP survive elimination in the VAR process. 
Will money be more prone to the emasculation of the VAR process 
than other economic variables? It is likely to be. The interrelationships 
of the financial system produce comovements in money and interest 
rates and other credit variables that appear to be more systematic than 
the varying effects of money on business activity. The latter effects 
will therefore have low power in VAR tests. 
3.9  General Observations about VAR and Time-Series Regressions 
Despite the above objections to VAR, the problem it addresses of 
endogeneity and spurious correlation cannot be waved aside. Indeed, 
the VAR  methodology derives from the accepted treatment of endog- 
enous independent variables in conventional time-series regressions. 
The conventional treatment of endogeneity in economic models has 
essentially assumed it away. In econometric estimation the lagging of 
independent variables supposedly makes them exogenous. As the VAR 
method indicates, this is not valid. Instrumental variables, widely used 
to avoid spurious correlation with the residual error term, are generally 
not exogenous to the system; they may reduce some spurious corre- 
lation but do not eliminate it. In reality nearly all the important effects 
in the economy reflect movements in variables that are basically  en- 
dogenous to the system. Even monetary and fiscal policy, which are 
typically treated as exogenous, basically are not.I2 Their endogeneity 
is sometimes handled  by  introducing reaction functions, based on a 
quadratic tradeoff between desired levels of inflation, unemployment, 
interest rates, and exchange rates. These functions have not worked. 
It is not possible to describe macroeconomic behavior solely in terms 
of exogenous variables. The economy is essentially a closed system. 
No doubt the weather is exogenous, but that is no help where agri- 
culture plays a minor role.  Even the sudden increase in oil prices by 
OPEC in  1973 and  1979 was  not  entirely  exogenous and, in  any 
event, cannot by itself fully explain the subsequent economic develop- 
ments. Long-run movements reflecting resource and productivity growth 
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movements.  Since regressions  require exogenous independent vari- 
ables, ordinary time-series regressions cannot provide valid evidence 
of economic effects. 
As a specific example, endogeneity problems plague estimation of 
the money demand equation. In different studies of the standard equa- 
tion a variety of specifications and explanatory variables are found to 
be significant. Not all of them are likely to be. Some of them are proxies 
for others, which means that the basic relationship cannot be identified 
precisely.  Interest  rates  and  real  income are treated as exogenous, 
which supposes that changes in  the money supply do not affect real 
income or interest rates. While possibly valid for the long run, these 
assumptions cannot  claim  validity for the  short  run.  Some studies 
(Goldfeld 1973, Artis and Lewis 1976) claim comparable results whether 
the money demand equation treats the interest rate as a dependent or 
independent variable.  The former is questionable, however, because 
real money balances have only a short-run influence on interest rates, 
quite different from the  long-run relation, and because real  income 
remaining on the right-hand side cannot be treated as independent of 
interest rates or real money balances. Furthermore, a study by Mehra 
(1978a) found that the interest rate and income are not exogenous to 
money when all are measured in nominal terms, yet the popular Koyck- 
lag adjustment, which gives better results when money balances are 
measured in nominal rather than real terms (Liang 1984, Fair 1987, but 
see Goldfeld and Sichel  1987), thus suffers from lack of  exogeneity. 
Finally, when joint estimation of  a supply equation takes account of 
the effect of  interest rates on money supply as well as demand, the 
interest rate is either treated as an exogenous variable or is assumed 
to be determined by the demand and supply of money (Teigen 1964, 
Brunner and  Meltzer  1964, Gibson  1972), ignoring the effect of  in- 
vestment demand. The VAR  method tells us that these estimation pro- 
cedures are invalid and the results highly questionable. 
To be sure, any sweeping rejection of regression analysis needs qual- 
ification. While cross-section data also suffer from spurious correla- 
tions, these are often amenable to treatment. Time-series regressions 
sometimes give acceptable estimates of the parameters when the pre- 
cise specification of an equation and the exogeneity of the independent 
variables can be taken for granted, as in some micro industry studies. 
Where interrelationships play out in a short time horizon and feedback 
is minimal, regressions  can identify influences.  Thus some work on 
asset price movements and relationships appear legitimate. And strict 
random walk hypotheses can be tested by time-series regressions. 
In general, however, time-series regressions sit on a shaky founda- 
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criterion of exogeneity. The well-known prevalence of correlation among 
virtually all economic variables and the ease of finding statistical sig- 
nificance in almost any specification of economic equations raise warn- 
ing flags. It is increasingly difficult to take the myriad runs of computer 
printouts seriously, except as simple descriptions of the data. Can any- 
one have confidence in regression methods when numerous studies of 
the same relationships for the same period give contradictory results? 
Time-series  regression  studies give no sign of the scientific ideal of 
converging toward the truth. If the call to take the “con” out of econ- 
ometrics (Learner 1983) led to a new practice of checking the robustness 
of regression equations to changes in specification, the result would be 
that few time-series regressions would stand up to a wide-ranging sen- 
sitivity analysis. Other variables can invariably be found to reduce any 
given partial  correlation.  Understandably, analyses showing lack of 
robustness heretofore have not appeared in articles offered to journals 
or accepted for publication. (See the proposal by Feige 1975.)  The VAR 
method calls our attention to the deficiency of present practices. 
The existence of  endogeneity and its corollary of multicollinearity 
and spurious correlation has long been recognized  as a problem for 
economics as a nonexperimental  science. The early warning of Yule 
(1 926)-“Why  do  we sometimes get nonsense correlations?”-has  long 
been simply ignored, though the problem is receiving increasing atten- 
tion (Granger and Newbold 1974, Learner 1983, Lovell 1983, Los 1986). 
The VAR  methodology tells us to dismiss any apparent effects of vari- 
ables that cannot be certified as exogenous. Its solution is to isolate 
exogenous “shocks”  to the variables. VAR  depends on the exogenous 
movements beicg sufficiently strong and numerous to show up after 
their extraction from the original data. It can identify a relationship 
among economic variables if  some indication of  it remains after the 
systematic movements in the time series are removed. 
But, while the VAR  method can help to confirm economic effects, 
its results, when often negative, are not conclusive. Money has diffi- 
culty passing VAR  tests, yet by  all other indications it plays an im- 
portant  role  in  business  fluctuations.  If  the  movements  in  money 
identified as endogenous by  VAR  and extracted from the data series 
were instead eliminated by  monetary policy, would the economy be 
the same? Hardly anyone thinks so. Since regression analysis cannot 
evaluate the effect of  these monetary changes, it fails in its principal 
purpose. 
Although skepticism  of  time-series  regressions has become  wide- 
spread, the practical consequences are widely resisted. The purpose 
and limitations of the VAR  method argue for less dependence on mac- 
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been invested in econometric time-series techniques for this to happen, 
at least very soon. As practiced today, empirical macroeconomics could 
not survive without them. 
Yet  empirical  research  need  not  be  so dependent  on  time-series 
regressions. It can proceed as it did before the computer made multiple 
regressions so cheap and plentiful. Economic research can reemphasize 
the kind of  careful historical analysis that we honor Anna Schwartz 
for at this conference. In such research the mutual relationship among 
variables can be studied, and the subtle differences among historical 
episodes can provide clues to the channels of  influence at work. The 
pseudo-precision  of regression analysis once seemed to promise sta- 
tistical tests of monetary effects, but now this appears to have been an 
illusion. In contrast to the questionable, conflicting, and obscure results 
of time-series regressions, general historical analysis presents under- 
standable evidence and, though lacking the finality of formal statistical 
testing, usually converges to a consensus on the facts and often also 
on an interpretation of the facts. I see an indication here and there in 
the journals of  a return to empirical studies where regressions may 
supplement but do not dominate a broad analysis. Anna Schwartz’s 
monetary research (1987) will not, it may  be hoped, be the last of  a 
fine tradition of  scholarship. 
Notes 
I. Suppose monetary changes are induced by the variable Z, so monetary 
effects on GNP are attributable to Z. The question is, if  the effect of Z on 
money could be altered, would Z still have the same effect on GNP?  If monetary 
effects exist, the answer is no, despite the fact that money is otherwise en- 
dogenous when determined by 2. 
2. Kaldor carried his argument of an endogenous money supply to  the amaz- 
ing  conclusion  that money has no effect on anything, apparently including 
prices. He does accord a minor role to “liquidity,” as described in the Radcliffe 
Report (1959), but not to any ordinary concept of money. In his model of the 
economy the price level appears to be tied to labor costs without a monetary 
anchor. For a similar view see Davidson and Weintraub (1973).  Fortunately, 
that point of view no longer has much of a following. 
On the importance of  the range  of  evidence in  A  Monetary  History,  see 
Hirsch and de Marchi (1986). 
3. Buiter (1984), in support of Tobin’s argument, notes that endogeneity of 
the money supply hides its effects in the data. He concludes that changes in 
policy regimes are needed to validate monetary effects. Cottrell (1986) defends 
Kaldor with an argument also based on the endogeneity of money. 
4. The emphasis on unanticipated monetary growth began with studies by 
Barro (1977, 1978, 1981) and Barro and Rush (1980) of U.S. data. Dutkowsky 
and Atesoglu (1986) verified that the model held up in postsample forecasts to 139  Money-Income Causality 
1984. Confirmatory support that only unanticipated changes in money affected 
output was provided by Leiderman (1980) for the United States, Wogin (1980) 
and Darrat (1985a) for Canada, Attfield, Demery, and Duck (1981a, 1981b) and 
Bellante, Morrell, and Zardkoohi (1982) for the United Kingdom, Darrat (1985b) 
for West Germany, Blejer and Fernandez (1980) for Mexico, and Attfield and 
Duck (1983) for a cross section of  eleven countries. Kormendi and Meguire 
(1984) found that monetary  shocks affected  output in forty-seven countries 
while the effects faded with time, which by suggesting no effect in the long 
run was consistent with the Barro thesis of the neutrality of anticipated mon- 
etary changes. Similarly, Haraf (1978) found that monetary  surprises affected 
inventories and orders before aggregate output, but appeared to have no long- 
term effect.  Brocato (1985) verified the U.S.  output effects of  unanticipated 
money, though  he ignored the anticipated component. Grossman (1979) con- 
cluded that only unanticipated changes in policy affected U.S. output, on the 
assumption  that policy determined aggregate demand as proxied by nominal 
GNP. Enders and Falk (1984) found that only unanticipated  money affected 
output for an individual industry, U.S. pork production. 
Many other studies cast doubt on these results, however. Barro (1979b) could 
not confirm his U.S. results for three foreign countries: for Mexico, anticipated 
money affected output, and for Brazil and Colombia, all monetary effects were 
weak, though  the inability to fit adequate money supply functions precluded 
clear conclusions. Anticipated money dominated the effect on output in Japan 
(Pigott 1978). Small (1979) revised Barro’s measurement of unanticipated money 
for the United States and found its effect to be no greater than that for antic- 
ipated money, though in reply, Barro (1979a)  defended his results. Froyen (1979) 
and Sheffrin (1979) also reported that anticipated money affected U.S.  output. 
Darby (1983) found an extremely weak effect of unanticipated money on output 
for seven foreign countries and only a small effect for the United States post- 
World War  11.  In a study of the pre-World  War  I  U.S. data under the gold 
standard (Rush  1985), neither  monetary  component affected  output.  Kim- 
brough and Koray (1984) got mixed results for Canada and negative results for 
the United States on output effects of unanticipated  money; in addition, they 
could not reject an effect of anticipated  money for either country. Similarly, 
in Darrat (1985~)  deflated aggregate money dominated unanticipated money in 
unemployment effects for three European countries. Demery, Duck, and Mus- 
grave (1984) could find only qualified support for unanticipated money effects 
on real variables for West Germany. Korteweg (1978) showed that anticipated 
money growth correlated with inflation in the Netherlands, but could find no 
effect of  money on output at all. Boschen and Grossman (1982) and Boschen 
(1985) reported no differences in output effects of  observed and unobserved 
money, which contradicts the supposed importance of anticipations. 
Another series of studies revised  Barro’s estimation procedure and found 
the same effect for anticipated and unanticipated money. These studies of U.S. 
data were Cuddington (1980), Makin (1982), Gordon (1982), Mishkin (1982a, 
1982b, 1983), Driscoll et al. (1983a), Merrick (1983), Carns and Lombra (1983), 
Sheehey (1984), Sheehan (1985), and Cecchetti (1986). Cecchetti  (1987) also 
reported similar results for eight foreign countries, as did Darrat (1985e) for 
Italy,  and  Hoffman  and  Schlagenhauf (1982) for the United  States and five 
foreign countries except for Canada, where anticipated money did not affect 
output. But Askari (1986) found that output was affected for Canada using a 
more complicated  statistical test. In a trivariate  autoregression  of  U.S. real 
GNP, prices, and  money,  McGee  and  Stasiak  (1985) found  that  anticipated 
money affected real GNP in the short run, though not the long run. For post- 140  Phillip Cagan 
World War I1 U.K. data, Garner (1982) and Driscoll et al. (1983b) found that 
anticipated money affected output in the short run, as  did Demery (1984) when 
allowance was made for expected changes in velocity; Driscoll, Mullineux, 
and Sen (1985) rejected the neutrality (that is, no  effect on  output)  of anticipated 
money and rational expectations in a joint test; and Bean (1984) rejected neu- 
trality for anticipated MI but not fM3. 
To  avoid the endogeneity  of anticipated  money, Rush (1986) showed that 
only shocks to the monetary base affected unemployment in the United States 
from 1920 to 1983 (except for the 1930s), and the estimated effect of the an- 
ticipated base had the wrong sign and presumably had no real effects. 
5. Nor is the interpretation of unanticipated money free of ambiguity. Pesaran 
(1982) points  out that, if  the money supply  were determined passively  by 
interest-rate targeting, the correlation of  the derived unanticipated monetary 
growth with output could be interpreted  as consistent with Keynesian types 
of nonmonetary effects on output. I find this Keynesian interpretation  doubtful 
because the Barro (1977) money supply equation implies a negative effect of 
government expenditures on output. Nevertheless, possible  spurious corre- 
lation opens up these results to alternative interpretations.  Rush (1985) inter- 
preted the lack of correlation between U.S. money and output in pre-World 
War I in his study as due to the endogeneity of money. 
6. In addition to Sims’s study (1972), evidence of a monetary effect was also 
found for the United States by Neftci and Sargent (1978), Brillembourg and 
Khan (1979), and Hafer (1981). Two-way effects between money and income 
were reported by Hsiao (1979b) in one test and only a weak relationship in a 
second test, and by Thornton and Batten (1985), who also found a short-run 
one-way effect of the monetary base, as did Mehra (1978). Paulter and Rivard 
(1979), however, found one-way effects of all the monetary aggregates but no 
effect of  the base. Ciccolo (1978) reported a  monetary effect for the U.S. 
interwar period and a weak two-way effect for the post-World  War I1 period. 
For other countries: Huffman and Lothian (1980) found mixed results for the 
United Kingdom-two-sided  effects for post-World  War I1 (as did Mixon, Pratt, 
and Wallace 1980), a weak monetary effect for 1870-1914,  and a strong mon- 
etary effect for 1837-70;  Hsiao (1979a), supported by Osborn (1984), found 
two-way  effects for Canada, as did Komura (1982) for Japan, Layton (1985) 
for Australia, and Wachter (1979) for money and prices in Chile; and unidi- 
rectional monetary effects were reported by Sharpe and Miller (1975) and Jones 
(1985) for Canada, von Hagen (1984) for West Germany, and by Darrat (1985d, 
1986) on prices for three major OPEC, and three North African, countries. 
Decidedly mixed results subject to the prefiltering method or the test used 
were reported by Sargent (1976), Schwert (1979), and  Kang (1985) for the 
United States, and Kamath (1985) for India. Falls and Hill (1985) found for the 
United States that money “caused”  prices but not output for 1972-79,  and 
the reverse of those effects for 1979-83,  apparently owing to the change in 
policy regime. Christian0 and Ljungqvist (1988) claim that insignificant mon- 
etary effects for the United States reflect an inappropriate first-differencing of 
the data. 
Negative results of causality tests for money were reported by Barth and 
Bennett  (1974) for Canada, qualified  by Auerbach and Rutner (1978); Feige 
and Pearce (1979) and Geweke (1986) for the United States; Pierce (1977) for 
monetary effects on U.S.  retail sales; Williams, Goodhart, and Gowland (1976) 
for U.K. output in post-World  War 11,  though they did find a monetary effect 
on prices; Mills  and Wood  (1978) for the U.K. gold-standard  period (1870- 
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many; and Parikh (1984) for Indonesia. Although money and prices appear to 
be causally independent in post-World  War  I1 Spain, C. and F.  Hernandez- 
Iglesias (1981) argue that bidirectional causality is  difficult  to detect without 
large changes as in hyperinflation. 
7. An early VAR study by Sargent and Sims (1977) found that money affected 
unemployment  in  the short run, and Sims (1980a) confirmed this result for 
GNP  in the United States but not in West Germany, where the effect was weak 
and in the long run nonexistent. For pre-World  War I, Dwyer (1985) found a 
monetary effect on  prices in the United States but none in the United Kingdom. 
Eichengreen (1983)  subdivided the U.K.  pre-World  War I  period and found 
effects of the monetary base after 1870 but not before.  For both the United 
States and United Kingdom  pre-World  War I, Huffman and Lothian (1984) 
found evidence of monetary effects on real income, but also cross-country 
feedback on money consistent with the specie-flow mechanism.  Their VAR 
included an interest rate, as did a trivariate test showing monetary effects on 
income and an interest rate for India (Laumas and Porter-Hudak 1986). 
However, monetary effects often disappear when an interest rate is included 
and partially do so when a debt variable is included. Sims (1980b) found no 
effect in the United States for post-World  War I1 data with an interest rate, 
nor did Hsiao (1982) for Canada. U.K. postwar output depended on monetary 
policy when proxied by M1 and an interest rate, but not when proxied by MI 
and M3 without  the interest  rate (Bean 1984). For post-World  War  I1  U.S. 
data, Myatt (1986) reported that money does not affect prices,  and Fackler 
(1985) that neither money nor a debt variable affects quarterly real GNP or 
prices, though possibly money and debt do so indirectly through the interest 
rate. Litterman and Weiss (1985) reported that a measure of the real interest 
rate is  the exogenous source of changes in money,  prices, and output. Ei- 
chenbaum and Singleton (1986) showed that these results could be sensitive 
to statistical technique: A monetary effect on real GNP  was significant when 
they removed a linear trend from the data, but was not significant when they 
used first differencing. In a more elaborate model adjusted for trend, Bernanke 
(1986) found a  significant monetary effect, as did Stock and Watson (1987) 
using the same data series as Sims (1980b).  It  is  difficult  to diagnose  how 
differences in statistical procedure affect all these results. 
Friedman (1983a, 1983b) initiated the VAR study of credit or debt and mon- 
etary effects. He reported that money and debt shared comparable effects on 
real income. McMillin and Fackler (1984) tested a range of financial aggregates 
including money and found that all except bank credit affected income, though 
there was feedback from income particularly  to money.  No consensus has 
emerged about debt. Porter and Offenbacher (1983) found the effects of money 
to be somewhat stronger than those of debt, but found the results to  be sensitive 
to the measurement and ordering  of the variables. King (1986) also  found money 
stronger than a bank loans variable and the results sensitive to ordering. Ber- 
nanke (1986) used a structural model to order the variables and found bank 
loans and money to be of equal importance. In Granger-causality tests (Hafer 
1985), both MI and debt affected GNP, but debt made no marginal contribution 
after the monetary effects, and the feedback of GNP  was greater on debt than 
on money. (In related earlier studies of policy indicators, debt and money had 
comparable  effects [Davis 19791 and debt effects on  GNP  that were independent 
of MI largely reflected the liquid asset component and, in the 1970s, largely 
M2 [Cagan 19821). 
8. A  problem also arises with  VAR  results attributing a  major exogenous 
influence to bank credit. Bernanke (1986) argues that shocks to the supply of 142  Phillip Cagan 
bank  credit  affect the amount rationed  to bank-tied  borrowers, who reduce 
spending and contract aggregate demand. If banks are unable to lend to their 
borrowers, however, a given total supply of credit will reach other borrowers 
in  the economy. If the total supply declines, one reason could be a reduction 
in monetary growth. If the VAR  removes correlated movements in money and 
credit, it  eliminates  important monetary  effects  on  aggregate demand  from 
consideration. 
The emphasis on rationed bank credit resurrects a largely forgotten contro- 
versy of the 1950s (see Bach and Huizenga 1961). 
9. The VAR test determines the level of significance of the monetary variables 
in the OLS regression 
(I)  log 0, = const. +  Za, log O,-, +  Xb, log M,-, 
+  Sc, log  +  Ed, log R,-, + 
where 0 is real GNP, M money stock (MI version), P GNP price deflator, R 
commercial  paper rate,  and  E  the residual  error; a, . . . , d are regression 
coefficients, and the summation 2 runs from i =  1 to 8 (eight lagged quarters). 
The two series in figure 3.1 are the residual values of the regression  with 
the money terms excluded (solid) and included (dotted). 
The money series in figure 3.2 was derived as follows. Each lagged value of 
money in the above regression was regressed on the other independent vari- 
ables. That is, eight regressions were run, one for each of the lagged log M(k), 
k  =  I, . . . ,  8, in  (1).  Each of these series was regressed on 
(2)  const. + Zf; log 0,-, + Xg,  log P,-, +  Xh, log R,-, 
+  Xi  log M,-, +  dk) 
where f,g,h,j are regression coefficients and the summation B runs from I  to 
8 quarters, except for the monetary lags which omit the lag term that corre- 
sponds to the dependent variable in each regression, 
Figufe 3.2 shows the sum for each quarter t of XhF,(k)  for k  =  I, . . . ,  8 
where bk is the estimated coefficients of  b, in (1). The simple correlation of this 
series with the residuals from regression (1) with the money terms excluded 
(the dotted series in figure 3.1) is equivalent to an F-test that all b, = 0 in (I). 
10. The literature  lacks a consensus on the length  of  monetary  lags but 
indicates considerable evidence of their variability. See Rosenbaum (1985). 
11. This was clearly  an exogenous  decision of  the authorities  to combat 
inflation, not a passive response of the money  supply to a decline in interest 
rates or economic activity.  See my discussion in Cagan (1979, esp. pp.  113- 
18). 
12. Goldfeld and Blinder (1972) claim that treating endogenous policy vari- 
ables as exogenous produces little bias in estimates of relevant economic pa- 
rameters. But see Crotty (1973) and Sims (1982). It would be useful to put this 
claim  to a  general  test, because I  find  it  highly  questionable  as a  general 
proposition. 143  Money-Income Causality 
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Comment  Robert H. Rasche 
Another paper presented at this conference proclaimed that the “dark 
age of vector autoregressions” has dawned (Bordo 1987). Cagan’s pa- 
per assumes the role of the Center for Disease Control or the Surgeon 
General. It warns there is a pernicious, communicable, even fatal threat 
to our profession  at  large  during  these  dark  days,  and  that  RATS 
(Regression Analysis of  Time Series) spread this plague!! 
Phil Cagan’s review  of  the literature  of  the past  two decades on 
money-income causality is critical, exhaustive, thoughtful, and thought- 
provoking. It is truly a tribute to Anna Schwartz and a masterful coun- 
terattack on the various accusations against a fundamental proposition 
ofA Monetary History, namely, that there is “an influence from income 
to  money  over the business cycle, yet. . . the main  influence both 
secularly and cyclically runs from money to income” (Bordo 1987, 5). 
However, the traditions and requirements for discussants set by our 
profession are not satisfied if I stop at this point. Moreover, as a prac- 
titioner of the time-series techniques that are the object of  the Cagan 
counterattack, I  am unwilling to run up the white flag and passively 
surrender. 
Counterattack: Hypothesis 
The fundamental approach of  the paper is the juxtaposition of  two 
competing hypotheses. Cagan’s maintained hypothesis throughout his 
review of  the money-income causality literature is: “Are time-series 
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regression techniques capable of detecting and measuring the impact 
of exogenous monetary disturbances on real output when the available 
time series reflect monetary regimes that permit endogenous changes 
in the money stock?” My reading is that Cagan uniformly rejects this 
hypothesis, but rejects in favor of what? The alternative hypothesis in 
his analysis is “Are historical analyses capable of detecting and mea- 
suring the impact of exogenous monetary disturbances on real output 
when  the  historical  monetary  regimes  have  permitted  endogenous 
changes in the money stock?” The major conclusion of his review is 
not just the rejection of the hypothesis of the adequacy of time-series 
regression  techniques.  It is the rejection  of  that hypothesis and the 
acceptance of the alternative hypothesis of the adequacy of historical 
analyses on the basis of the demonstrated inadequacies of  the time- 
series techniques. 
My  evidence for this  characterization  of  Cagan’s  argument  is  as 
follows: First, that the question of the (partial) endogeneity of monetary 
disturbances is not at issue is found early in the paper: “The empirical 
evidence that money, prices, and activity are related, now widely ac- 
cepted, raises the question of  the direction of influence. A Monetary 
History gives it major attention.” 
Second, there is the rejection of the hypothesis of the adequacy of 
time-series regression techniques: “Regression methods foster this ov- 
ersight because of their weak ability to disentangle a two-way depen- 
dence”;  “The  new  ‘causality’ tests  emphasize  the  point  that  the 
existence of  serial correlation and feedback compromise evidence based 
solely on conventional time-series regressions”; “The VAR  seems to 
me to be hopelessly unreliable and low in power to detect monetary 
effects of the kind we are looking for and believe, from other evidence, 
to exist”; and “Since regression analysis cannot evaluate the effect of 
these monetary changes, it fails in its principal purpose.” 
Third, the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis of the adequacy 
of historical analyses: “In such [historical] research the mutual rela- 
tionship among variables  can be  studied, and the subtle differences 
among historical episodes can provide clues to the channels of influence 
at work”; and “. . . general historical analysis presents understandable 
evidence and . . . usually converges to a consensus on the facts and 
often also on an interpretation of the facts.” 
Repulse: Weaknesses of the Attack on Time-Series Analysis 
In my view, there are two problems that invalidate Cagan’s conclu- 
sion. The first is that even if  we accept the evidence presented as a 
conclusive demonstration  that time-series  regression  techniques  are 
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yses are adequate. It is quite possible that both research strategies are 
“unreliable and low in power to detect monetary effects of the kind 
we are looking for,”  as it  is also possible  that both approaches can 
reliably detect such monetary effects given the way that central banks 
have operated historically. Cagan asserts (or assumes) that his rejection 
of  time-series regression  analysis validates  the  historical  approach. 
There is no evidence in his review of  the reliability or power of  the 
historical analysis approach. 
The second problem is there are occasions when there is a circularity 
in  the argument against time-series regression techniques. In several 
places in the review, it is asserted that time-series analysis fails because 
it does not support known propositions. A closer examination reveals 
that the known propositions are the conclusions of previous historical 
research. Thus, the conclusion that the time-series techniques are in- 
adequate is sometimes conditional upon the adequacy of the historical 
research approach. Should the technique or conclusions of the previous 
historical analysis be faulty, then the alleged failure of the time-series 
analysis may be no failure at all. 
An example of this circularity of reasoning is the quotation above in 
which VAR analysis is dismissed because it does not detect “monetary 
effects . . . we believe, from other evidence, to exist.” The only other 
evidence alluded to in the entire review is the conclusions of historical 
analyses. Later, the conditional nature of  the rejection of time-series 
techniques is  clear:  “Linearity  governs all regression  analyses. . . . 
But for monetary effects it is not reasonable. . . . Monetary episodes 
vary substantially in timing and cannot all be represented by the same 
values of parameters and fixed lagged patterns. This seems clear from 
historical analysis”  (emphasis added); and “Money has difficulty pass- 
ing VAR  tests, yet by all other indications it plays an important role 
in business fluctuations. . . .  Since regression analysis cannot evaluate 
the effects of these monetary changes, it fails in its principal purpose” 
(emphasis added). 
Regroup: Some Alternative Sources of Concern Regarding Specific 
Time-Series Techniques 
Cagan specifically addresses four different types of time-series anal- 
ysis: (1) the “Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc” criticism of  timing anal- 
ysis; (2) models that attempt to distinguish the effects of “anticipated” 
versus“unanticipated”  monetary  growth;  (3)  bivariate  “causality” 
models; and (4) vector autoregresions (VAR). Extensive discussions 
of  the first and third of  these approaches appear in  the existing lit- 
erature and, for the  most  part, his review  summarizes the existent 
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address the “anticipated”  versus “unanticipated”  money models and 
the VAR  approach to time-series modeling. There are some interesting 
ideas  in these two areas that deserve further elaboration. 
The most important comment in Cagan’s paper about the anticipatedl 
unanticipated money literature is that “These studies raise a question 
about the meaning and measurement of anticipated monetary growth.” 
The motivation for such models derives from a theoretical literature in 
which agents know the structure of the economy, possess information 
on the history  of  various  “policy  variables,”  and form expectations 
“rationally”  based  on this information set. Under these conditions, 
and if  prices adjust to clear markets continually, then the conclusion 
follows that anticipated money growth, in the sense of the best forecast 
of  money growth from the available information, does not affect real 
output. 
A well-known class of models (Fischer 1977; Taylor 1979) relaxes 
only the assumption of market clearing and generates the result that 
both anticipated and unanticipated money growth have nonzero effects 
on real output. The different conclusion arises because in the latter 
models there is a difference between the best forecast of current money 
growth and the expectation of  the inflation rate, given the available 
information set. 
Relaxation  of  the assumptions on the information  set in  different 
ways would undoubtedly further muddy the waters. We  need to re- 
member that before the monumental work of A Monetary History and 
Monetary  Statistics, data on the stock and growth rate of money in 
the United States were not available weekly from local newspapers (or 
even Federal Reserve statistical releases) at virtually no cost. Banking 
and Monetary Statistics, initially published in  1943, provides data only 
at semiannual intervals. As late as 1959, the “Details of Deposits and 
Currency” table in the Federal Reserve Bulletin provided data only on 
a last-Wednesday-of-the-month basis. As Friedman and Schwartz note 
in Monetary Statistics: “Comprehensive coverage of all banks at an- 
nual dates, did not become available until 1959, when the Federal Re- 
serve System published its compilation of  these reports in A//  Bank 
Statistics, and even this compilation goes back only to 1896” (1970, 
212). The availability of information on economic statistics, which we 
so easily take for granted, is a recent phenomenon and one to which 
Anna Schwartz has made significant contributions. 
None  of  this literature  has  progressed  beyond  the  assumption of 
known reduced-form coefficients models. In reality, the best informa- 
tion that agents can possess is unbiased estimates of the true reduced- 
form coefficients that are subject to sampling error. Indeed, given the 
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assumption about the true state of  an agent’s information set. Once 
stochastic coefficient reduced forms are part of  the information set, 
then the meaning and measurement of anticipated money growth be- 
comes considerably more complex. The effects of such models on the 
specification error of the available empirical studies of anticipated and 
unanticipated money growth remain undetermined. 
The major thrust of Cagan’s objection to VAR  analysis is that the 
“VAR method cooks the data beyond recognition,” and that monetary 
effects are not adequately represented by  linearity (or log-linearity). 
The problem with this criticism is that it comes close to arguing that, 
in one way or another, monetary events are unique. If this is the case, 
then we will never untangle the interdependence of money and income, 
since as Cagan is aware, “a two-way dependence cannot be confirmed 
by one observation.” 
A  more substantive criticism of commonly practiced  VAR analysis 
is that it is incapable of answering the question of what effect money 
has on real output under the acknowledged nature of  historical mon- 
etary  policymaking. Given acceptance  of  a two-way  dependence of 
money and income, the residuals or innovations studied in typical VAR 
analyses-which  Cagan feels do not demonstrate the well-known ef- 
fects of money on income-are  just not the appropriate residuals. Sims 
(1980) clearly acknowledges that after construction of the moving av- 
erage representation of a VAR system by the now conventional orthogo- 
nalization approach: 
The residuals whose effects are being tracked are the residuals from 
a system in which contemporaneous values of other variables enter 
the  right-hand  sides of  the regressions  with  a triangular  array  of 
coefficients. (p. 21) 
The structure of such a system is a Wold causal chain, not the struc- 
ture of the economy that is of concern to Cagan or to A  Monetary 
History. Given  the  restrictions  that  Sims imposes on the data, the 
moving average representations are not unique, i.e., the economic sys- 
tem of concern to Cagan is not identified. The issue in the interpretation 
of  the  VAR  results is  identiJication. It  would appear that  a skillful 
practitioner can use both historical analyses and time-series analyses 
to shed some light on the issue of  a two-way dependence between 
money and income. To quote Sims (1980): 
We  may sometimes be able to separate endogenous and exogenous 
components in policy variables by careful historical analysis, in ef- 
fect using a type of instrumental variables procedure for estimating 
a structural  relation  between policy variables  and the rest of  the 
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The message is that more information is available to analysts than 
that contained in economic time series. This additional information is 
important and can supplement time-series analysis in ways that over- 
come the inherent limitations of staring myopically at the time-series 
entrails.  This message has a much higher  marginal product than one 
that says we must abandon time-series analysis altogether and return 
to the fundamental scholarship of historical analysis.  Certainly it is 
important to deplore the mechanical manipulation of economic time 
series, but it is also important to recognize that historical analyses and 
time-series analyses are not mutually  exclusive, nor are they substi- 
tutes. Indeed, the highest quality “scholarship” in our profession com- 
bines  the  two  approaches  to produce  lasting  contributions to  the 
advancement of our understanding. Anna Schwartz’s contributions rank 
with the best in this latter tradition. 
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General Discussion 
KOCHIN  offered an alternative explanation for the dominance of interest 
rates in a VAR  incorporating the money stock, an interest rate, and 
real output. He argued that, in an efficient market, interest rates absorb 
all  the information available  in  the monetary series simply  because 
interest rates are anticipating whatever information is available about 
future money. That information will be in the interest rate as it becomes 
available, which may be before it is incorporated in the money supply. 157  Money-Income Causality 
Thus, for example, if  there is a projection  in October 1989 of faster 
growth in the monetary base and higher inflation in the 1990s, and that 
information becomes available in October 1987, interest rates would 
go up during  October  1987, even if  the monetary base has not yet 
increased. So the rise in interest rates in  1987  will, according to the 
VAR analyst, cause the inflation of the 1990s. 
POOLE,  in  a similar vein, pointed  out that the interest rate,  as a 
speculative price in the markets, filters out the noise in the money data. 
People in  the markets are responding  to the systematic part of the 
monetary influence, as well as other things. So it is not surprising that 
the interest rate drives out money. 
CACAN  argued that the movements in  interest rates are more sys- 
tematically related to real GNP than is money. Otherwise they would 
both have an equal chance of playing that role. 
MCCALLUM  reiterated his  1983  explanation for Sims’s 1980 finding 
of little influence of monetary policy innovations in a VAR containing 
money, interest rates, and real output. He had argued that, if the mon- 
etary authorities  are using the interest rates as  an instrument, you would 
expect the interest rate to show up as a better indicator of monetary 
policy surprises than the money stock. 
He raised an objection to Cagan’s argument. Interest rate targets, 
Cagan stated, have not always ruled monetary policy, particularly be- 
yond short horizons.  According to McCallum, that statement seems 
to confuse the difference between an interest rate instrument and an 
interest rate target-a  target being an objective of policy  and an in- 
strument being  something to do with  operating procedures. Interest 
rate instruments have been in effect throughout the postwar period, 
which is the period of concern here. Even during the 1979-82  regime, 
indirect interest rate instruments were used. Furthermore, his argu- 
ment presumes that this obtains only at short-run horizons, that it is 
only over a period of a month or six weeks that these things are fixed 
and held rigid. 
STOCKMAN  warned  against rejecting a statistical technique because 
the results are not all uniform. He pointed out that not all applications 
of the VAR approaches have treated data in exactly the same way. For 
example, there is a substantial difference in the results that people get 
if  they take linear time trends out of the data rather than if  they take 
growth  rates. And that can be explained  because taking the growth 
rates of a time series amounts to applying one filter to the data, while 
taking linear trends out is another filter altogether, and it makes sense 
that using different filters leads to different results.  When we plot the 
squared gains from these filters, we find that taking the growth rate of 
a time series leaves more in at the higher frequencies while taking out 
linear time trends leaves less in at higher frequencies and more in at 158  Phillip Cagan 
lower frequencies. The differences in the answers that economists ob- 
tain with different filters, therefore, gives us information that we could 
use for subsequent statistical analyses and for construction or evalu- 
ation of  theories.  If  detrending versus taking growth  rates makes a 
difference for the correlation of two economic variables, then we would 
like a theory that predicts this difference. 
He then expanded on why using different filters may make a differ- 
ence. He pointed out that if you plot the squared gain from these filters 
against frequency, you can compare the results of applying d-log filters 
to the data to taking out a linear time trend. In this kind of  plot, the 
squared gain of a linear time trend is flat, except at a zero frequency. 
But the squared gain of the d-log filter rises, starting out lower at high 
frequencies and getting higher at low frequencies.  The  relationship 
between any two economic variables can differ across frequencies- 
there are high frequency relationships and low frequency relations. By 
using the d-log filter, one is looking mostly at the higher frequency 
relationships. By taking out a linear time trend and then looking at the 
detrended series, one is looking less at the higher frequency relations 
and more at the lower frequency relations than is the case with the d- 
log filter. 
He argued that presumably economic theory should tell us something 
about whether there are some short-run relationships or long-run re- 
lationships between these variables. He described research he has done 
with Marianne Baxter where they found that the correlation between 
foreign and U.S. industrial production was about the same under pegged 
or floating exchange rates when they took linear time trends out of the 
data, while the correlations between growth rates of  industrial  pro- 
duction were  lower under flexible exchange rates. That, he  argued, 
suggests that short-run (high frequency) correlations are lower under 
flexible rates, while longer-run correlations are unaffected.  And that 
might be explained by greater national monetary autonomy under float- 
ing rates, combined with a short-run, but not long-run, effect of money 
on industrial production. 
MCCALLUM  made the point that the use of VARs is just a technique 
of descriptive statistics-that  running a VAR  is comparable to calcu- 
lating the mean of a series of data, or calculating the standard devia- 
tion-it  is just a slightly more complicated descriptive statistic. One is 
not going to get any understanding from any descriptive statistic un- 
aided. It must be combined with some sort of understanding that relates 
the descriptive statistics to the characteristics of the system. 
BRUNNER  described a critique of  Granger-causality tests in a paper 
by William Schwert published in  the Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series (1979). Schwert argued that the tests are badly misnamed. They 
do not test causality but actually test incremental information.  They 159  Money-Income Causality 
simply reveal whether the addition of  some variables raises our infor- 
mation level about the future value of the dependent variable. Brunner 
then gave an example to show that this is very different from a causality 
test. Suppose we construct a quantity theory world with specific sto- 
chastic processes controlling money, velocity, and output. The optimal 
forecast of inflation is determined by a distributed lag on past rates of 
inflation. Adding money to the regression yields nothing. All the rel- 
evant information is already contained in the past rates of  inflation. 
But this does not mean that money has no causal effect. We  know by 
construction that money substantially influences the ongoing inflation. 
CAGAN  reiterated the main point of his paper-that  a lot of the the- 
oretical objections to VARs  did not focus on what the real problem 
was, namely,  that  VAR  looks for a very  rigid  relationship  between 
money and output that does not exist. By not finding that relationship, 
one should not jump to the conclusion that there was no effect. 
In reply to Rasche, he accepted that there are a lot of problems with 
general historical analysis. You  have to persuade by an accumulation 
of evidence, interpreting different episodes. This he believes is the best 
we can do. By contrast, econometrics provides formal statistical tests 
of these propositions. In his opinion, formal statistical tests where the 
t-statistic tells you yes or no is not sufficient to determine whether you 
have  an  effect.  His  paper  is  thus  a  protest  against  such  use  of 
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